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Moral Heuristics and Moral Framing
Cass R. Sunsteint
INTRODUCTION
Consider two positions voiced by many people in the
American media in 2003:
A. When you have been a fan of a sports team, you have a
moral obligation to continue to be a fan even if the team
is now terrible. It is disloyal to cease being a fan merely
because the team keeps losing. "Once you're a fan,
you're a fan for life."
B. In opposing military action to topple Saddam Hussein,
France violated its moral obligations. The United States
liberated France from Hitler's Germany, and if the
United States favored military action to topple Saddam
Hussein, France was under a moral obligation to sup-
port the United States.
Both of these claims are absurd. A sports team is not a
* This essay is based on the 2003-04 John Dewey Lecture in the Phi-
losophy of Law, delivered by Professor Sunstein at the University of Minne-
sota Law School on September 24, 2003. The lectureship is named in honor of
John Dewey, American philosopher, educator, and scholar. The John Dewey
Lectureship is funded by a grant from the John Dewey Foundation and is
sponsored by the University of Minnesota Law School to provide a forum for
significant scholarly contributions to the development of jurisprudence.
t Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence,
Law School and Department of Political Science, University of Chicago. I am
grateful to Jonathan Baron, Emily Buss, Mary Anne Case, Elizabeth Emens,
Carolyn Frantz, Charles Larmore, Eric Posner, Adrian Vermeule, and John
Yoo for valuable comments on a previous draft; I also thank participants in an
extremely helpful work-in-progress lunch at the University of Chicago Law
School. This essay is a revised and expanded version of the John Dewey Lec-
ture, delivered at the University of Minnesota Law School in September 2003.
I am grateful to the faculty and students at the law school for their kindness
and superb questions and comments at the time; those questions and com-
ments resulted in many revisions and improvements.
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person or a friend, but a collection of strangers, whose person-
nel changes over time. There is nothing immoral about follow-
ing and supporting a team in one year, but ignoring or disliking
that same team a few years later. You do not have a moral ob-
ligation to continue to support a sports team. To be sure,
France owes the United States a debt of gratitude and more.
And if America's position is right, France should agree with
America. But France was not obliged to accept the American
position on war with Iraq in return for America's acts during
World War II-certainly not if France believed that such a war
would be unjust or against the interests of all those concerned.
Of course there are vigorous arguments on behalf of collective
responsibilities and group-level attachments. But even if we
accept those arguments, and believe in collective responsibili-
ties, we are most unlikely to endorse these claims about the
moral obligations of sports fans and France.
What is interesting about these claims is not their absurd-
ity, but the fact that both of them have a structure, one that
makes them humanly recognizable rather than arbitrary or
unintelligible. In both cases, people are overgeneralizing from a
moral intuition that works well in daily life.1 In the case of the
sports team, the moral intuition involves relationships between
friends. It is morally wrong to be a "fair-weather friend"; you
should not abandon a friend who has fallen on hard times. If
the relationship between fans and teams is analogous to the
relationship between friends, then it is also morally wrong to
be a "fair-weather fan." In the case of France, friendship is also
the operative analogy. If people save your life, you should be
loyal to them; you should not stab your benefactors in the back
when they are at risk. Both claims take sound moral intuitions,
useful for most of life's situations, and generalize them to su-
perficially similar contexts in which those intuitions lose their
1. On overgeneralization, see Jonathan Baron, Nonconsequentialist De-
cisions, 17 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 1, 4-5 (1994) [hereinafter Baron, Nonconse-
quentialist Decisions]. I have learned a great deal from Baron's analysis and
from his work in general. Overgeneralization might be said to be distinguish-
able from misapplication of a principle, as when a principle, sensibly designed
for one setting, is senselessly applied to another. See JONATHAN BARON,
JUDGMENT MISGUIDED: INTUITION AND ERROR IN PUBLIC DECISION MAKING
8-20 (1998) [hereinafter BARON, JUDGMENT MISGUIDED]. By overgeneraliza-
tion, I mean simply to refer to use of a principle that ordinarily works well in a
situation in which it does not; I do not intend a distinction from the overlap-
ping idea of misapplication.
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foundations. In both cases, people are using moral heuristics-
moral shortcuts, or rules of thumb, that work well most of the
time, but that also systematically misfire.
My major goal in this essay is to suggest that moral heu-
ristics play a pervasive role in moral, political, and legal judg-
ments, and that they produce serious mistakes.2 Often such
heuristics represent generalizations from a range of problems
for which they are indeed well suited. Usually such heuristics
work well. The problem arises when the generalizations are
wrenched out of context and treated as freestanding or univer-
sal principles, applicable to situations in which their justifica-
tions no longer operate. Because the generalizations are
treated as freestanding or universal, their application seems
obvious, and those who reject them appear morally obtuse, pos-
sibly even monstrous. I want to urge that the appearance is
misleading. By drawing attention to moral heuristics, I hope to
give a possible answer to the puzzling question about why peo-
ple persist in making moral errors. Often, I suggest, the answer
lies not in self-interest, stupidity, or venality, but in the use of
heuristics that misfire.
Pioneering the modern work on the use of heuristics in
cognition, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky contended that
in assessing probabilities, "people rely on a limited number of
heuristic principles which reduce the complex tasks of assess-
ing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental
operations."3 This contention has produced an extensive litera-
ture,4 and much controversy has developed over the vices and
virtues of the heuristics, some of them "fast and frugal," that
play a role in both life and law.5
The relevant literature, however, rarely investigates the
possibility that in the moral and political domain, people also
rely on simple rules of thumb that often work well but that
2. I build throughout on a brief discussion in Cass R. Sunstein, Hazard-
ous Heuristics, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 751-52 (2003).
3. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND
BIASES 3 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY].
4. For a recent collection, see HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter
HEURISTICS AND BIASES].
5. See id.; GERD GIGERENZER ET AL., SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE Us
SMART 27-28 (1999).
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sometimes misfire.6 In fact the central point seems obvious.
Much of everyday morality consists of simple rules that gener-
ally make sense but that fail in certain cases. It is wrong to lie
or steal, but if a lie or a theft would save a human life, lying or
stealing is probably obligatory. Not all promises should be kept.
It is wrong to try to get out of a long-standing social commit-
ment at the last minute, but if your child is in the hospital, you
are morally required to do exactly that. In politics, party affilia-
tion, political identification, and leaders operate as heuristics.
A self-identified Democrat might favor an increase in the
minimum wage simply because the party favors such increases;
a self-identified Republican might have supported the war with
Iraq simply because President Bush did so. In the same vein,
many people used party affiliation as a heuristic for answering
the question of whether President Clinton should have been
impeached.
Similar processes are at work in law. Some people believe
that if Justice Antonin Scalia supports a certain position, it is
likely to be right; Justice Scalia's view can do the work of a
more fine-grained inquiry into the issues at stake. For many
Justices, there is a corresponding heuristic. The "Scalia heuris-
tic" is supplemented by the "Breyer heuristic" and the
"O'Connor heuristic"; there are 'Warren Court" and "Lochner
Court" heuristics too. Those who follow these heuristics much
simplify their own processes of evaluation, but they might well
end up adopting some conclusions that they would repudiate
after more sustained reflection. Every law professor knows that
a class discussion can be reframed, and students polarized, by
specifically attributing a view to the Rehnquist Court or to Jus-
tice Brennan. For questions of policy, heuristics play a large
role. Should human cloning be banned? Should pesticides be
regulated more severely than organic foods? Answers to these
questions inevitably reflect the influence of heuristics. And if
good heuristics misfire in the factual domain, they will inevita-
bly do so in the domains of morality, politics, and law as well.
I believe that an understanding of moral, political, and le-
gal heuristics casts light on a number of widely held but ulti-
mately implausible and sometimes even absurd intuitions-
intuitions that belong in the same category as those involving
6. Exceptions include BARON, JUDGMENT MISGUIDED, supra note 1, and
David Messick, Equality as a Decision Heuristic, in PSYCHOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE (Barbara Mellers & Jonathan Baron eds., 1993).
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baseball fans and France. These intuitions play a large role in
many domains. An understanding of moral heuristics simulta-
neously raises doubts about certain methods of inquiry in
moral and political philosophy, methods that depend on elicit-
ing moral intuitions about exotic cases that people almost
never face in daily life.7 Those who use these methods seem to
me inadvertently to be following the research agenda used by
Kahneman and Tversky: design a case, never actually encoun-
tered, in which intuitions, however firm, are likely to go wrong.
Because Kahneman and Tversky were dealing with facts
and elementary logic, they could demonstrate that the intui-
tions led to unambiguous errors. Unfortunately, that cannot be
demonstrated here. In the moral and political domains, it is
hard to come up with unambiguous cases where the error is
both highly intuitive and, on reflection, uncontroversial-where
people can easily be embarrassed about their own intuitions.
But I think that the sports fan and France cases belong in just
this domain and that other moral intuitions, of far greater
practical importance, can be similarly understood. My minimal
suggestion is that moral heuristics exist and are indeed perva-
sive. We should not treat the resulting moral intuitions as fixed
points for analysis, rather than as unreliable and at least po-
tentially erroneous.
I. ORDINARY HEURISTICS IN ACTION
A. AVAILABILITY
The classic work on heuristics and biases deals not with
moral questions, but with issues of fact.8 With respect to heu-
ristics, the basic claim is that in answering hard factual ques-
tions, those who lack accurate information use simple rules of
thumb. How many words, on a particular page, will have "ing"
as the last three letters? How many words, on a particular
page, will have the "n" as the second-to-last letter? Most people
7. See Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in J.J.C. SMART &
BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 149-50 (1973).
8. The key papers can be found in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY,
supra note 3; a more recent collection is HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 4.
The heuristics-and-biases literature should be distinguished from the litera-
ture on prospect theory, which involves the nature of people's utility functions
under conditions of risk, not mental shortcuts under conditions of uncertainty.
See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Deci-
sion Under Risk, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 17-44 (2000).
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think that a significant number of words will end in "ing," and
that a smaller number of words will have "n" as the second-to-
last letter 9-even though a moment's reflection shows that this
cannot possibly be true. People err because they use an identi-
fiable heuristic-the availability heuristic-to answer difficult
questions about probability. When people use this heuristic,
they answer a question of probability by asking whether exam-
ples come readily to mind.10 How likely is a flood, an airplane
crash, a traffic jam, a terrorist attack, or a disaster at a nuclear
power plant? Lacking statistical knowledge, people try to think
of illustrations. Thus, "a class whose instances are easily re-
trieved will appear more numerous than a class of equal fre-
quency whose instances are less retrievable."" For people with-
out statistical knowledge, it is far from irrational to use the
availability heuristic; the problem is that this heuristic can
lead to serious errors of fact, in the form of excessive fear of
small risks and neglect of large ones.
B. REPRESENTATIVENESS
The most famous example of the representativeness heu-
ristic involves the likely career of a hypothetical woman named
Linda, described as follows: "Linda is 31 years old, single, out-
spoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a stu-
dent, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination
and social justice and also participated in antinuclear demon-
strations."2 People were asked to rank, in order of probability,
eight possible futures for Linda. 3 Six of these were fillers (psy-
chiatric social worker, elementary school teacher); the two cru-
cial ones were "bank teller" and "bank teller and active in the
feminist movement." Most people said that Linda was less
likely to be a bank teller than to be a bank teller and active in
the feminist movement. 4 This is an obvious logical mistake, a
conjunction error, in which characteristics A and B are thought
to be more likely than characteristic A alone. The error stems
9. HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 4, at 21.
10. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 3, at 3, 11-14.
11. Id. at 11.
12. Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited:
Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES, su-
pra note 4, at 62 (citing Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 3, at 92).
13. Id.
14. Id.
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from the representativeness heuristic: Linda's description
seems to match "bank teller and active in the feminist move-
ment" far better than "bank teller."15
In an illuminating and even profound reflection on the ex-
ample, Stephen Jay Gould observed, "I know [the right an-
swer], yet a little homunculus in my head continues to jump up
and down, shouting at me-'but she can't just be a bank teller;
read the description." 6 We shall return to Gould's homunculus
on several occasions.
The representativeness heuristic appears to explain many
bad decisions by baseball scouts, who have in mind a "proto-
type" of a successful baseball player, and rely on the prototype
to make decisions.17 Undoubtedly personnel decisions in many
domains are based on prototypes in a way that produce many
wise choices but also some unwise ones. The representativeness
heuristic also helps explain what Paul Rozin and Carol Nemer-
off call "sympathetic magical thinking," including the beliefs
that some objects have contagious properties and that causes
resemble their effects.18 Many educated Americans will not eat
food touched by a sterilized cockroach.19 They refuse chocolates
that have been shaped into realistic-looking dog feces.2 ° They
are reluctant to use sugar from a bottle labeled "Sodium Cya-
nide, Poison," even if they are assured, and believe, that the
bottle really contains sugar and never contained cyanide-and
indeed even if they themselves placed the label, arbitrarily, on
that particular bottle!2' In fact people are reluctant to eat sugar
labeled "Not Sodium Cyanide," apparently because the very
words "Sodium Cyanide" automatically conjure negative asso-
ciations.22
I speculate that the immense popularity of organic foods
15. Id.
16. STEPHEN JAY GOULD, BULLY FOR BRONTOSAURUS: REFLECTIONS IN
NATURAL HISTORY 469 (1991).
17. See MICHAEL LEWIS, MONEYBALL: THE ART OF WINNING AN UNFAIR
GAME 15-20 (2003); see also Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Who's on
First, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 1, 2003, at 28.
18. See Paul Rozin & Carol Nemeroff, Sympathetic Magical Thinking: The
Contagion and Similarity "Heuristics," in HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note
4, at 201.
19. Id. at 202.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
1562 [Vol 88:1556
MORAL HEURISTICS AND FRAMING
owes a great deal to the representativeness heuristic, above all
because of the view that there is an association between the
natural and the healthy, and between chemical and danger.23 I
speculate too that many unjustified judgments about security
risks are fueled by the representativeness heuristic. The in-
ternment of Americans of Japanese descent, at the early stages
of World War II, was undoubtedly connected with the use of
that heuristic after the attack on Pearl Harbor. And might not
the same heuristic help explain the widespread belief, held by a
majority of Americans, that Saddam Hussein was involved in
the attacks of September 1 1?21
C. AFFECT
A great deal of recent attention has been paid to the fact
that people often have a rapid, largely affective response to ob-
jects and situations, including job applicants, consumer prod-
ucts, animals, cars, and causes of action. 25 A jury might have an
immediate negative reaction to a plaintiff in a personal injury
case; a judge might have a positive intuitive reaction to an
equal protection claim; an employer might instantly like, or
dislike, someone who has applied for a job.26
Can affect operate as a "heuristic"? Paul Slovic and his co-
authors suggest an affirmative answer.2' They contend that our
affective responses occur rapidly and automatically, and that
people use their feelings as a kind of substitute for a more sys-
tematic, all-things-considered judgment.28 Unfortunately, there
is an obvious sense in which it is unhelpful to treat "affect" as
an explanation for someone's attitude toward objects. In some
settings, affect represents, or is, that very attitude, and there-
23. For criticism of that association, see JAMES COLLMAN, NATURALLY
DANGEROUS: SURPRISING FACTS ABOUT FOOD, HEALTH, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 1-2 (2001) (challenging the belief that organic products are
necessarily safe and wholesome).
24. Dana Milbank & Claudia Deane, Hussein Link to 9/11 Lingers in
Many Minds, WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 2003, at Al (noting that sixty-nine percent
of Americans polled by the Washington Post believed that Saddam Hussein
was linked to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks).
25. Paul Slovic et al., The Affect Heuristic, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES,
supra note 4, at 414-15 (discussing the affect heuristic).
26. See Timothy Wilson et al., Mental Contamination and the Debiasing
Problem, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 4, at 185, 198-99.
27. Slovic et al., supra note 25, at 397.
28. Id.
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fore cannot explain or account for it. (Would it be helpful to ex-
plain Tom's romantic attraction to Anne by saying that Anne
produces a favorable affect in Tom?) The idea must be that af-
fect works in the same way as availability and representative-
ness: in many contexts, people's emotional reactions are substi-
tuting for a more careful and deliberative inquiry into the
(factual?) issues at stake.
The simplest way to establish this would be to proceed as
Kahneman and Tversky originally did, by showing, for exam-
ple, that people assess questions of probability by reference to
affect, and that this method leads to predictable errors. What is
the probability of death from smoking, driving, flying, or eating
pesticides? If people's affect toward these activities matched
their probability judgments, producing systematic error, it
would certainly be plausible to speak of an affect heuristic.
While we do not have data of this sort, there is some closely
related evidence suggestive of an affect heuristic in the domain
of risk. When asked to assess the risks and benefits associated
with certain items, people tend to say that risky activities con-
tain low benefits, and that beneficial activities contain low
risks.29 It is rare that they will see an activity as both highly
beneficial and quite dangerous, or as both benefit-free and dan-
ger-free. Because risk and benefit are distinct concepts, this
finding seems to suggest that "affect" comes first, and helps to
"direct" judgments of both risk and benefit.
The claim is fortified by a study asking people to make de-
cisions under time pressure. 30 The motivating claim is that the
affect heuristic is more efficient than analytic processing in the
sense that it permits especially rapid assessments. Under time
pressure, the experimenters hypothesize that there would be
an unusually strong inverse correlation between judged risk
and judged benefit, because affect will be the determinant of
assessment, and people will have less time to undertake the
kind of analysis that could begin to pull the two apart.3 The
hypothesis is confirmed: under time pressure, the inverse cor-
32relation is even stronger than without time pressure.
The affect heuristic raises many puzzles, because affect it-
29. Id. at 410-13.
30. Id. at 412.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 412-13.
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self remains to be explained; undoubtedly the availability and
representativeness heuristics play a role in producing affect.
But an understanding of the role of affect casts a number of
facts in a new light. Background mood, for example, influences
33decisions and reactions in many domains. Consider the re-
markable fact that stock prices increase significantly on sunny
days, a fact that is hard to explain in terms that do not rely on
affect. 34 Another study suggests that when people are anxious
and fearful, they are less likely to engage in systematic process-
ing and more prone to error.35 Still another study finds that
when people are afraid, they are more likely to engage in nega-
tive stereotyping of members of other social groups."
D. HEURISTICS AND DUAL PROCESSING
Kahneman and Shane Frederick have suggested that the
heuristics should be seen in light of dual-process theories of
cognition.37 Those theories distinguish between two families of
cognitive operations, sometimes labeled System I and System
II. System I is intuitive; it is rapid, automatic, and effortless
(and it features Gould's homunculus). System II, by contrast, is
reflective; it is slower, self-aware, calculative, and deductive.
Kahneman and Frederick suggest that System I proposes quick
answers to problems of judgment, while System II operates as a
monitor, confirming or overriding those judgments. Consider,
for example, someone who is flying from Chicago to New York
in the month after an airplane crash. This person might make
a rapid, barely conscious judgment, rooted in System I, that the
flight is quite risky; but there might well be a System II over-
33. See Alice M. Isen, Positive Affect and Decision Making, in RESEARCH
ON JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 509, 513 (William M. Goldstein & Robin
Hogarth eds., 1997).
34. See David Hirschleifer & Tyler Shumway, Good Day Sunshine: Stock
Returns and the Weather (2001), at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/results.cfm.
35. See Gordon B. Moskowitx et. al., The History of Due Process Notions:
and the Future of Preconsious Control, in DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 12, 19-20 (Shelly Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds., 1999) (noting
that "people who are anxious about or vulnerable to a health threat, or other-
wise experiencing stress may engage in less careful or less extensive process-
ing of health relevant information").
36. See William von Hippel et al., Attitudinal Process Versus Context: The
Role of Information Processing Biases in Social Judgment and Behavior, in
SOCIAL JUDGMENTS 251, 263 (Joseph P. Forgas et al. eds., 2003).
37. For overviews, see SOCIAL JUDGMENTS, supra note 36; DUAL-PROCESS
THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 35.
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ride, bringing a more realistic assessment to bear.
Kahneman and Frederick also offer a general claim about
the nature of heuristics: they operate through a process of at-
tribute substitution . In this process, people are interested in
assessing a "target attribute," and they do so by substituting a
"heuristic attribute" of the object, which is easier to handle.39
Consider the question whether more people die from suicides or
homicides. Lacking statistical information, people might re-
spond by asking whether it is easier to recall cases in either
class (the availability heuristic). The response might well be
sensible, but it might also lead to errors.
Is it possible that System I and System II operate in the
moral domain as well? Might people have rapid, intuitive moral
assessments, subject to correction by the more deliberative
processes reflected in System II? Might moral judgments sub-
stitute a heuristic attribute for a target attribute? Might the
same be true in legal contexts? There is every reason to suggest
an affirmative answer to these questions. Juries are likely to be
affected by simple heuristics about guilt or innocence and about
the police; ordinary moral assessments, about who has done
right and who has done wrong, are much influenced by the
availability, representativeness, and affect heuristics.
II. MORAL HEURISTICS: A CATALOGUE
If we take seriously the possibility that moral claims oper-
ate as heuristics, we might be able to imagine some very ambi-
tious claims. Some of the largest moral theories might be char-
acterized and ultimately rejected in this way.
A. EXCESSIVELY AMBITIOUS STARTS
Consider the view that much of everyday morality, nomi-
nally concerned with fairness, should be seen as a set of heuris-
tics for the real issue, which is how to promote utility.0 Armed
with psychological findings about the use of heuristics, utili-
tarians might be tempted to claim that ordinary moral com-
mitments are a set of mental shortcuts that generally work
well, but that also produce severe and systematic errors. Sup-
38. Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 12, at 51-52.
39. Id. at 53.
40. See BARON, JUDGMENT MISGUIDED, supra note 1, at 14-18; see also
Louis KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002).
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pose people are committed to retributivism as their preferred
theory of punishment. Might they be making a cognitive error?
(Is Kantianism a series of cognitive errors?) With respect to
moral principles, deontologists and utilitarians typically agree
about concrete cases; they can join in accepting the basic rules
of criminal and civil law. When deontologists and others depart
from utilitarian principles, perhaps they are operating on the
basis of heuristics that usually work well but that sometimes
misfire.
But easy victories are unlikely here. In the case of many
ordinary heuristics, based on availability and representative-
ness, people can be readily embarrassed once it is shown that
their judgments cannot possibly map onto reality." If they are
not embarrassed, an easily accessible objective standard can
demonstrate an error of fact or logic. In the moral domain, this
is harder to demonstrate. To say the least, people who reject
utilitarianism are not easily embarrassed by a demonstration
that their moral judgments can lead to reductions in utility. In
the moral domain, it is more difficult to produce a widely
shared standard by which to test the question of mistake.
Consider, for example, the controversy over the effort by
Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell to demonstrate that princi-
ples not based entirely on welfare sometimes produce policies
that make everyone worse off.42 Kaplow and Shavell urge that
if the legal system attempts to promote fairness, it will under-
mine people's actual welfare-possibly the welfare of most or
even all individuals.43
Many critics have refused to accept the Kaplow/Shavell ar-
gument on behalf of welfare even if it is assumed that this ar-
gument is essentially correct on its own terms.44 Indeed, those
who reject utilitarianism might easily turn the tables. They
41. Note that this point does not hold for all heuristics. See Deborah
Frisch, Reasons for Framing Effects, 54 ORG. BEHAV. & HUMAN DECISION
PROCESSES 399, 421-23 (1993) (demonstrating that many heuristics are quite
sticky, even when identified as such).
42. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 40, at 52-58.
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Should We All Be Welfare Econo-
mists?, 101 MICH. L. REV. 979, 980 (2003) (commenting that, "if accepted,
Kaplow and Shavell's argument would support recognition only of rights that
tend to be utility-maximizing"); Jules L. Coleman, The Grounds of Welfare,
112 YALE L.J. 1511 (2003) (reviewing LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL,
FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002)).
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might contend that the rules recommended by utilitarians are
consistent, much of the time, with what morality requires-but
also that utilitarianism, taken seriously, produces bad mis-
takes in some cases. On this view, utilitarianism is itself a heu-
ristic, one that usually works well but leads to systematic er-
rors.45 And indeed, many debates between utilitarians and their
critics involve claims, by one or another side, that the opposing
view leads to results, in particular cases, that are inconsistent
with widespread intuitions and should be rejected for that rea-
46
son.
These large debates are unlikely to be tractable, simply be-
cause utilitarians and deontologists are most likely to be un-
convinced by the suggestion that their defining commitments
are mere heuristics. Here there is a large difference between
moral heuristics and the heuristics uncovered in the relevant
psychological work, where the facts, or simple logic, provide a
good test of whether people have erred. If people tend to think
that more words, on a given page, end with the letters "ing"
than have "n" in the next-to-last position, something has
clearly gone wrong.47 If people think that some person named
Linda is more likely to be a "a bank teller who is active in the
feminist movement" than a "bank teller," there is an evident
problem.48 In the cases that concern me here, factual blunders
and simple logic do not provide such a simple test.
In some particular cases, however, we might be able to
make some progress by investigating less abstract commit-
ments and entertaining the hypothesis that for them, some
widely accepted rules are heuristics. Consider, for example, the
commitment to colorblindness, or the view that free speech is
"an absolute." For those who believe that discrimination
against African-Americans is far worse than discrimination
against whites, the idea of colorblindness might seem to be a
heuristic: an overgeneralization of a sound moral principle that
usually works well, or that worked well in the context for which
it was designed, but that misfires when applied to affirmative
action. The idea that free speech is "an absolute," or can never
45. See generally LOCAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA (Jon Elster ed., 1995) (dis-
cussing the overlap between utilitarianism and deontological accounts).
46. See, e.g., SMART & WILLIAMS, supra note 7 (providing both an outline
and critique of utilitarian principles).
47. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
48. See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
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be regulated, is palpably wrong. But, many people believe that
they are committed to it, and perhaps the commitment is a
heuristic that serves desirable social functions.
In fact many people show absolute commitments to various
propositions. In one study, strong majorities of people said that
the following items were unacceptable no matter how great the
benefits: electing a politician who has made racist comments,
cutting all trees in an old-growth forest, sterilizing retarded
women, building a new water system with pipes found to con-
tain lead, and medical removal of dying patients' organs with-
out their consent.49 But in the same study, people were also
asked to think of counterexamples; when so asked, significant
numbers of people changed their position, concluding that their
commitment was not in fact absolute." People were also sensi-
tive to the probability that harm would occur. With respect to
the protection of endangered species and ecological harms from
genetic engineering, many people will say, in the abstract, that
they will not tolerate tradeoffs.5 ' But if the probability of harm
is low enough, people are willing to create risks to endangered
species and of ecological harm.52 These findings strongly sug-
gest that when people speak in absolute terms, they are gener-
alizing from most situations, producing moral heuristics that
predictably misfire.
Or turn to the question whether government is ever per-
mitted to torture known (or suspected) terrorists, even in con-
texts in which torture is the only way to prevent a massive
number of deaths. A flat prohibition on torture might be justi-
fiable on ethical grounds. But perhaps any flat prohibition is
really a heuristic, one that works well most or almost all of the
time, but that also leads to mistakes in imaginable cases.
Should government ever be permitted to experiment on human
beings? What about severely disabled human beings with cog-
nitive capacities below those of, say, chimpanzees? A ban on
certain medical experiments on human beings might be a heu-
ristic, unsuited to imaginable cases.
I strongly suspect that in all of these cases, heuristics are
at work. Unfortunately, however, it is difficult to establish this
49. Jonathan Baron & S. Leshner, How Serious Are Expressions of Pro-
tected Values?, 6 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 183, 185 (2000).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 186.
52. Id.
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point without making highly contentious claims about the mer-
its.5 3 Some people believe that colorblindness is morally and
legally required; they do not believe that they are using a heu-
ristic. No one really thinks that free speech is an absolute; the
implausibility of that belief is simple to demonstrate, and after
thinking about the regulation of bribery, perjury, and conspir-
acy, Gould's homunculus is nowhere to be found. Those who
oppose torture, and who object to any medical experimentation
on human beings, would not be easily embarrassed by the
imaginable cases concocted by their adversaries.
Let us consider, then, some more promising possibilities. 54
In most of the examples that follow, I believe that it is possible
to conclude that a moral heuristic is at work without accepting
any especially controversial normative claims. To accept some
of these examples, it will be necessary for readers to accept no
contestable substantive position at all. To accept others, it will
be necessary to accept only one substantive position, which we
might call "weak consequentialism." According to weak conse-
quentialism as I am understanding it here, the social conse-
quences of the legal system are relevant, other things being
equal or nearly so, to what law ought to be doing. Weak conse-
quentialists can reject utilitarianism; they might agree that a
violation of rights is part of the set of consequences that must
be considered. They argue only that the full set of consequences
is relevant to what must be done. Weak consequentialism, in
the form that I am understanding it here, seems to me suffi-
ciently nonsectarian to support the idea that in the cases at
hand, moral heuristics are playing a significant role.
B. POINTLESS PUNISHMENT AND INCENTIVE NEGLECT
People's intuitions about punishment seem quite discon-
nected with the consequences of punishment, in a way that
suggests that a moral heuristic may well be at work. Suppose,
for example, that a corporation has engaged in serious wrong-
53. For strong evidence without such claims, see id. at 192 (asserting that
people "will not accept actions that violate [protected values] if the probability
or amount of the harm is small relative to the probability and magnitude of
benefit").
54. On the question of whether moral commitments are as absolute as
they appear, see Baron & Leshner, supra note 49, at 183-84, which finds two
effective ways of challenging such commitments: the first is to ask people to
think of counterexamples; the second is to give people extreme examples such
as preventing individuals from shouting "fire" in a crowded theater.
1570 [Vol 88:1556
MORAL HEURISTICS AND FRAMING
doing. People are likely to want to punish the corporation as if
it were a person. 5 They are unlikely to inquire into the possi-
bility that the consequences of serious punishment (say, a stiff
fine) will not be to "hurt" corporate wrongdoers, but instead to
decrease wages, increase prices, or produce lost jobs. Punish-
ment judgments are rooted in a simple heuristic, to the effect
that penalties should be a proportional response to the outra-
geousness of the act. In thinking about punishment, people use
an outrage heuristic.56 According to this heuristic, people's pun-
ishment judgments are a product of their outrage. This heu-
ristic produces reasonable results in most circumstances, but in
some cases, it seems to me to lead to systematic errors.
Consider, for example, an intriguing study of people's
judgments about penalties in cases involving harms from vac-
cines and birth control pills.58 In one case, subjects were told
that the result of a higher penalty would be to make the com-
pany try harder to make safer products. 9 In an adjacent case,
subjects were told that a higher penalty would make the com-
pany more likely to stop making the product, with the result
that fewer safe products would be on the market.6 ° Most sub-
jects, including a group of judges, gave the same penalties in
both cases." "Most of the respondents did not seem to notice
the incentive issue."62 Let us call the resulting set of judgments
a form of incentive neglect, which is apparently pervasive. In
another study, people said that they would give the same pun-
ishment to a company that would respond with safer products
and one that would be unaffected because the penalty would be
55. For evidence to this effect, see generally PUNITIVE DAMAGEs: How
JURIES DECIDE (Cass R. Sunstein et al. eds., 2002); Daniel Kahneman et al.,
Shared Outrage and Erratic Awards: The Psychology of Punitive Damages, 16
J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 49, 58-72 (1998).
56. See Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revis-
ited: Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES,
supra note 4, at 49, 63-65.
57. Id.
58. Jonathan Baron & Ilana Ritov, Intuitions About Penalties and Com-
pensation in the Context of Tort Law, 7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 17 (1993).
59. Id. at 22-23.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 23-26.
62. See Jonathan Baron, Heuristics and Biases in Equity Judgments: A
Utilitarian Approach, in PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE, supra
note 6, at 109, 123 (discussing the study reported in Baron & Ritov, supra note
58).
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secret (with those who would know retiring) and covered by
insurance (whose price would not increase).63 Here too the ef-
fects of the punishment did not affect judgments by a majority
of respondents.64
A similar result emerged from a test of punishment judg-
ments that asked subjects, including judges and legislators, to
choose penalties for dumping hazardous waste.65 In one case,
the penalty would make companies try harder to avoid waste.66
In another, the penalty would lead companies to cease making
a beneficial product.67 Most people did not penalize companies
differently in the two cases.68 Most strikingly, people preferred
to require companies to clean up their own waste, even if the
waste did not threaten anyone, instead of spending the same
amount to clean up far more dangerous waste produced by an-
other, now-defunct company.69 How could this preference make
sense? Why should a company be asked to engage in a course of
action that costs the same but that does much less good?
In these cases, I think that it is most sensible to think that
people are operating under a heuristic, requiring punishment
that is proportional to outrageousness, and thinking that pun-
ishment should not be based on consequential considerations.
As a general rule, of course, it is plausible to think that penal-
ties should be proportional to the outrageousness of the act.
But it is fanatical to insist on this principle regardless of
whether the consequence would be to make human beings safer
and healthier. Those who insist on proportional punishments
might disagree; perhaps they would contend that in neglecting
consequences, they are embracing a large principle to which
they are committed. But it might be worthwhile for them to
consider the possibility that they have been tricked by a heuris-
tic-and that their reluctance to acknowledge the point might
be a product not of a sound principle, but of the insistent voice
of their own version of Gould's homunculus.
63. Id. at 123-24.
64. Id.
65. Jonathan Baron et al., Attitudes Toward Managing Hazardous Waste:
What Should Be Cleaned Up and Who Should Pay for It?, 13 RISK ANALYSIS
183, 184 (1993).
66. Id. at 185.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 186-87.
69. Id. at 190-91.
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C. BETRAYALS
To say the least, people do not like to be betrayed. A be-
trayal of trust is likely to produce a great deal of outrage.0 If a
babysitter neglects a child, or if a security guard steals from his
employer, people will be angrier than if the identical acts are
performed by someone in whom trust has not been reposed. So
far, perhaps, so good: when trust is betrayed, the damage is
worse than when an otherwise identical act had been commit-
ted by someone who was not a beneficiary of trust. It should
therefore not be surprising that people will favor greater pun-
ishment for betrayals than for otherwise identical crimes.7'
The disparity can be plausibly justified on the ground that
the betrayal of trust is an independent harm, one that war-
rants greater deterrence and retribution-a point that draws
strength from the fact that trust, once lost, is not easily re-
gained. A family robbed by its babysitter is more seriously in-
jured than a family who has been robbed by a thief. The loss of
money is compounded and possibly dwarfed by the violation of
a trusting relationship. The consequence of the violation might
also be more serious. Will the family ever feel entirely comfort-
able with babysitters? Along the same line, it is bad to have an
unfaithful spouse, but it is even worse if the infidelity occurred
with your best friend, because that kind of infidelity makes it
harder to have trusting friendships in the future.
In this light, it is possible to understand why betrayals
produce special moral opprobrium and, where the law has been
violated, increased punishment. Consider, however, a finding
that is much harder to explain: People are especially averse to
risks of death that come from products (like air bags) designed
to promote safety. The aversion is so great that people have
been found to prefer a chance of dying as a result of accidents
from a crash to a significantly lower chance of dying in a crash
as a result of a malfunctioning air bag.72 The study involved
70. See generally Jonathan J. Koehler & Andrew D. Gershoff, Betrayal
Aversion: When Agents of Protection Become Agents of Harm, 90
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 244 (2003) (relying
on five empirical studies to find that acts of betrayal elicited stronger desired
punishments than other bad acts).
71. Id. at 245. Similarly, a study of "aversion to safety product" betrayal
risks found that "when faced with a choice among pairs of safety products...
most people preferred inferior options (in terms of overall risk exposure) over
those that were associated with a slim chance of betrayal." Id. at 257.
72. Id. at 252-56.
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two principal conditions. In the first, people were asked to
choose between two equally priced cars, Car A and Car B.73 Ac-
cording to crash tests, there was a 2% chance that drivers of
Car A, with Air Bag A, will die in serious accidents as a result
of the impact of the crash." With Car B, and Air Bag B, there
was a 1% chance of death, but also an additional 1 in 10,000
(0.01%) chance of death as a result of deployment of the air
bag.75 Similar studies involved vaccines and smoke alarms.76
The result was that over two-thirds of participants chose
the higher risk safety option when the less risky one carried a
"betrayal risk."77 A control condition demonstrated that people
were not confused about the numbers: when asked to choose
between a 2% risk and a 1.01% risk, people selected the 1.01%
risk so long as betrayal was not involved." In other words, peo-
ple's aversion to betrayals is so great that they will increase
their own risks rather than subject themselves to a (small)
hazard that comes from a device that is supposed to increase
safety. "Apparently, people are willing to incur greater risks of
the very harm they seek protection from to avoid the mere pos-
sibility of betrayal."79 Remarkably, "betrayal risks appear to be
so psychologically intolerable that people are willing to double
their risk of death from automobile crashes, fires, and diseases
to avoid incurring a small possibility of death by safety device
betrayal.""
What explains this seemingly bizarre and self-destructive
preference? I suggest that a heuristic is at work: Punish be-
trayals of trust. The heuristic generally works well. But it mis-
fires badly in some cases, as when those who deploy it end up
increasing the risks they themselves face. An air bag is not a
security guard or a babysitter, endangering those whom they
have been hired to protect; it is a product, to be chosen if and
only if it decreases aggregate risks. If an air bag makes people
safer on balance, people should use it, even if in a tiny percent-
73. Id. at 254.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 254-55 (finding results similar to those using the air bag sce-
nario).
77. Id. at 255.
78. Id. at 256.
79. Id. at 244.
80. Id. at 255.
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age of cases it creates a risk that would not otherwise exist. To
reject air bags on grounds of betrayal is not entirely rational-
not entirely rational but understandable, the sort of mistake to
which heuristics often lead human beings. People's unwilling-
ness to subject themselves to betrayal risks, in circumstances
involving products and an increase in likelihood of death, is the
moral cousin to the use of the representativeness heuristic in
the Linda case.81
In a sense, the special antipathy to betrayal risks might be
seen to involve not a moral heuristic but a taste. In choosing
products, people are not making pure moral judgments; they
are choosing what they like best. A purer test of a moral heu-
ristic would involve an experiment asking whether people are
averse to betrayal risks when they are purchasing safety de-
vices for their friends or family members. I am unaware of no
such direct test, but it is certainly reasonable to expect that it
would not produce substantially different results from those in
the experiments just described. In fact, closely related experi-
ments support that expectation. In deciding whether to vacci-
nate their children from the risks of serious diseases, people
report a form of "omission bias." Many people are more alert to
the risks of the vaccination than to the risk from the disease, so
much so that they will expose their children to a greater risk
from "nature" than from the vaccine.83 The omission bias re-
flects a moral heuristic, to the effect that people ought not to
take affirmative steps that will inflict risks on their own chil-
dren. The omission bias is closely related to the special antipa-
thy to betrayals.
D. HUMAN CLONING AND TAMPERING WITH NATURE
By a large margin, most Americans reject human cloning
and believe that it should be banned.84 To say the least, the
81. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
82. See Ilana Ritov & Jonathan Baron, Reluctance to Vaccinate: Omission
Bias and Ambiguity, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 168, 184 (Cass R.
Sunstein ed., 2002) (finding that "[slubjects are reluctant to vaccinate when
the vaccine can cause bad outcomes, even if the outcomes of not vaccinating
are worse").
83. Id.
84. According to a comparison of survey results compiled by the Center for
Genetics and Society, when asked, "Should scientists be allowed to clone hu-
mans?," 85% of Americans in a May 2002 CBS News poll answered "no." In a
Gallup poll for May 2002, 90% of Americans opposed cloning that is designed
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ethical and legal issues here are extremely complex. It is neces-
sary, for example, to distinguish between reproductive and
nonreproductive cloning; the former is designed to produce
children, whereas the latter is designed to produce cells for
therapeutic use. With respect to reproductive cloning, it is im-
portant to identify the particular grounds for moral concern. Do
we fear that cloned children would be means to their parents'
ends, and if so why? Do we fear that they would suffer particu-
lar psychological harm? Do we fear that they would suffer from
especially severe physical or psychological problems?
In a discussion of the problem of new reproductive tech-
nologies, above all cloning, Leon Kass points to the "wisdom of
repugnance."8 5 Kass writes:
People are repelled by many aspects of human cloning. They recoil
from the prospect of mass production of human beings, with large
clones of look-alikes, compromised in their individuality; the idea of
father-son or mother-daughter twins; the bizarre prospects of a
woman's giving birth to and rearing a genetic copy of herself, her
spouse, or even her deceased father or mother; the grotesqueness of
conceiving a child as an exact replacement for another who has died;
the utilitarian creation of embryonic genetic duplicates of oneself, to
be frozen away or created when necessary, in case of need for homolo-
gous tissues or organs for transplantation; the narcissism of those
who would clone themselves and the arrogance of others who think
they know who deserves to be cloned or which genotype any child-to-
be should be thrilled to receive; the Frankensteinian hubris to create
human life and increasingly to control its destiny; man playing
God....
We are repelled by the prospect of cloning human beings not be-
cause of the strangeness or novelty of the undertaking, but because
we intuit and feel, immediately and without argument, the violation
of things that we rightfully hold dear.... Shallow are the souls that
have forgotten how to shudder.'
Kass is correct to suggest that revulsion toward human
cloning might be grounded in legitimate concerns, and I mean
to be agnostic here on the question whether human cloning is
to specifically result in the birth of a human being, and 61% opposed cloning of
human embryos for use in medical research. According to a February 2001
Time/CNN poll, 92% of surveyed Americans were of the opinion that the pros-
pect of creating genetically superior human beings did not justify creating a
human clone. CENTER FOR GENETICS AND SOCIETY, Summary of Survey Re-
sults, at http://www.genetics-and-society.org/analysis/opinion/summary.
html (last visited Mar. 6, 2004).
85. Leon R. Kass, The Wisdom of Repugnance, in LEON R. KASS & JAMES
Q. WILSON, THE ETHICS OF CLONING 3, 17-24 (1998).
86. Id. at 17-19.
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ethically defensible. But I want to suggest that moral heuristics
might well be responsible, for Kass seeks to celebrate as "we
intuit and feel, immediately and without argument."' In fact,
Kass's catalogue of alleged errors seems to me an extraordinary
exercise in the use of such heuristics. Availability operates in
this context, not to drive judgments about probability, but to
call up instances of morally dubious behavior (for example,
"mass production of human beings, with large clones of look-
alikes, compromised in their individuality").8 The representa-
tiveness heuristic plays a similar role (for example, "the
Frankensteinian hubris to create human life and increasingly
to control its destiny"). 9 But I believe that Kass gets closest to
the cognitive process here with three words: "man playing
God."90
In many contexts, a simple heuristic plays a large role in
judgments of fact and morality: Do not tamper with nature.
That heuristic helps explain many risk-related judgments. For
example, "[hiuman intervention seems to be an amplifier in
judgments on food riskiness and contagion," even though "more
lives are lost to natural than to man-made disasters in the
world."" Studies show that people overestimate the carcino-
genic risk from pesticides and underestimate the risks of natu-
ral carcinogens. s' They also believe that nature implies safety,
so much that they will prefer natural water to processed water
even if they are chemically identical.93 The moral injunction
against tampering with nature plays a large role in public ob-
jections to genetic engineering of food, and hence legal regula-
tion of such engineering is sometimes driven by that heuristic,
rather than by a deliberative encounter with the substantive
issues."4 The idea that we should not tamper with nature is so
87. Id. at 19.
88. Id. at 17.
89. Id. at 18.
90. Id.
91. Paul Rozin, Technological Stigma: Some Perspectives from the Study
of Contagion, in RISK, MEDIA, AND STIGMA 31, 38 (James Flynn et al. eds.,
2001).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See ALAN MCHUGHEN, PANDORA'S PICNIC BASKET: THE POTENTIAL
AND HAZARDS OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS 230-42 (2000) (providing
evidence that organic foods are not necessarily safer than genetically modified
foods).
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wildly implausible that it cannot account for the intensity of
public opposition to cloning. There appears to be a narrower
heuristic at work, bred in part, perhaps, from the cognitively
available tale of Frankenstein's monster: Do not tamper with
natural processes for human reproduction. It is not clear that
this heuristic works well, but it is clear that it systematically
misfires.
E. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
An automobile company is deciding whether to take certain
safety precautions for its cars. In deciding whether to do so, it
conducts a cost-benefit analysis, in which it concludes that cer-
tain precautions are not justified because, say, they would cost
$100 million and save only four lives, and because the company
has a "ceiling" of $10 million per life saved-a ceiling that is, by
the way, significantly higher than the amount the Environ-
mental Protection Agency uses for a statistical life.95 How will
ordinary people react to this decision? The answer is that they
will not react favorably.96 In fact, people tend to punish compa-
nies that base their decisions on cost-benefit analysis, even if a
high valuation is placed on human life. By contrast, they im-
pose less severe punishment on companies that are willing to
impose a "risk" on people but that do not produce a risk analy-
sis that measures lives lost and dollars, and trades one against
another.97 What underlies these moral judgments?
A careful look raises the possibility that when people dis-
approve of trading money for lives, they are generalizing from a
set of moral principles that are generally sound, and even use-
ful, but that work poorly in some cases. Consider the following
moral principle: Do not knowingly cause a human death. In or-
dinary life, you should not engage in conduct with the knowl-
edge that several people will die as a result. If you are playing
some sport or are working on your yard, you ought not to con-
tinue if you believe that your actions will kill others. Invoking
95. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90 GEO. L.J. 2255,
2274 (2002) (citing the EPA amount of $6.1 million per life saved).
96. See W. Kip Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act?, 52 STAN.
L. REV. 547, 556-58 (2000) (observing that jury awards tend to be higher
when companies base decisions on cost-per-life-saved assessments).
97. See id.; see also Philip Tetlock, Coping With Tradeoffs, in ELEMENTS
OF REASON: COGNITION, CHOICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF RATIONALITY 239 (Ar-
thur Lupia et al. eds., 2000).
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that idea, people disapprove of companies that fail to improve
safety when they are fully aware that deaths will result. By
contrast, people do not disapprove of those who fail to improve
safety while believing that there is a "risk" but appearing not to
know, for certain, that deaths will ensue. When people object to
risky action taken after cost-benefit analysis, it seems to be
partly because that very analysis puts the number of expected
deaths squarely "on screen."98 Companies that are aware that a
"risk" exists but fail to do such analysis do not make clear, to
themselves or anyone else, that they caused deaths with full
knowledge that this was what they were going to do. People
disapprove, above all, of companies that cause death know-
ingly.99
Note that it is easy to reframe a probability as a certainty,
and vice-versa; if I am correct, the reframing is likely to have
large effects. Consider two cases:
A. Company A knows that its product will kill ten people.
It markets the product to its ten million customers with
that knowledge. The cost of eliminating the risk would
have been $100 million.
B. Company B knows that its product creates a one in one
million risk of death. Its product is used by ten million
people. The cost of eliminating the risk would have been
$100 million.
I have not collected data, but I am willing to predict, with a
high degree of confidence, that Company A would be punished
more severely than Company B, even though there is no differ-
ence between the two.
I suggest, then, that a moral heuristic is at work, one that
imposes moral condemnation on those who knowingly engage
in acts that will result in human deaths. Of course this heuris-
98. It is also the case that explicit trading of money for lives is strongly
disfavored. See Tetlock, supra note 97, at 239. I am hypothesizing that some of
this effect, and possibly a great deal of it, comes from the fact that someone
has knowingly engaged in action that will result in deaths.
99. Compare here the "identifiable victim effect": people will expend a
great deal to prevent a certain death to a single identifiable victim, and far
less to eliminate a statistically larger harm in the form, for example, of a risk
of 1/10,000 faced by 100,000 people. See generally Deborah A. Small & George
Loewenstein, Helping a Victim or Helping the Victim: Altruism and Identifi-
ability, 26 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5 (2003); Karen E. Jenni & George
Loewenstein, Explaining the "Identifiable Victim Effect," 14 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 235 (1997).
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tic does a great deal of good.100 The problem is that it is not al-
ways unacceptable to cause death knowingly, at least if the
deaths are relatively few and an unintended byproduct of gen-
erally desirable activity. When government allows new high-
ways to be built, it knows that people will die on those high-
ways. When government allows new power plants to be built, it
knows that some people will die from the resulting pollution.
When companies produce tobacco products, and when govern-
ment does not ban those products, hundreds of thousands of
people will die. Much of what is done by both industry and gov-
ernment is likely to result in one or more deaths. Of course it
might well make sense in most or all of these domains to take
extra steps to reduce risks. That proposition does not, however,
support the implausible claim that we should disapprove of any
action taken when deaths are foreseeable.
I do believe that it is impossible to vindicate, in principle,
the widespread social antipathy to cost-benefit balancing. But
here too, "a little homunculus in my head continues to jump up
and down, shouting at me" that corporate cost-benefit analysis,
trading dollars for a known number of deaths, is morally unac-
ceptable. The voice of the homunculus, I am suggesting, is not
reflective, but instead a product of System I, and a crude but
quite tenacious moral heuristic.
F. EMISSIONS TRADING
In the last decades, those involved in enacting and imple-
menting environmental law have experimented with systems of
"emissions trading.""1 In those systems, polluters are typically
given a license to pollute a certain amount, and the licenses can
be traded on the market. The advantage of emissions trading
systems is that if they work well, they will ensure emissions
reductions at the lowest possible cost.
Is emissions trading immoral? Many people believe so.102
Michael Sandel, for example, urges that trading systems "un-
100. It is even possible that the heuristic leads to better results, on bal-
ance, than a more refined approach that attempts to distinguish among differ-
ent situations. See infra Part IV.
101. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON 274-76 (2002).
102. See Michael Sandel, It's Immoral to Buy the Right to Pollute, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 15, 1997, at A23; see also STEVEN KELMAN, WHAT PRICE
INCENTIVES? 28-91 (1982) (rejecting an economic incentive approach to emis-
sion standards and outlining the purported social costs).
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dermine the ethic we should be trying to foster on the environ-
ment." ' 3 He contends:
[Tiurning pollution into a commodity to be bought and sold removes
the moral stigma that is properly associated with it. If a company or a
country is fined for spewing excessive pollutants into the air, the
community conveys its judgment that the polluter has done some-
thing wrong. A fee, on the other hand, makes pollution just another
cost of doing business, like wages, benefits and rent."M
In the same vein, he objects to proposals to open carpool
lanes to drivers without passengers who are willing to pay a
fee. Here, as in the environmental context, it is undesirable to
permit people to do something that is morally wrong so long as
they are willing to pay for the privilege.
I believe that like other critics of emissions trading pro-
grams, Sandel is using a moral heuristic and that he has been
fooled by his homunculus. The heuristic is this: People should
not be permitted to engage in moral wrongdoing for a fee. You
are not allowed to assault someone so long as you are willing to
pay for the right to do so; there are no tradable licenses for
rape, theft, or battery. The reason is that the appropriate level
of these forms of wrongdoing is zero (putting to one side the
fact that enforcement resources are limited; if they were unlim-
ited, we would want to eliminate, not merely to reduce, these
forms of illegality). But pollution is a different matter. At least
some level of pollution is a byproduct of desirable social activi-
ties and products, including automobiles and power plants.
Certain acts of pollution, including those that violate the law or
are unconnected with desirable activities, are certainly wrong,
but the same cannot be said of pollution as such. When Sandel
objects to emissions trading, he is treating pollution as equiva-
lent to a crime in a way that overgeneralizes a moral intuition
that makes sense in other contexts. There is no moral problem
with emissions trading as such. The insistent objection to emis-
sions trading systems stems from a moral heuristic.
G. ACTS AND OMISSIONS
To say the least, there has been much discussion of
whether and why the distinction between acts and omissions
might matter for morality, law, and policy.105 In one case, for
103. Sandel, supra note 102.
104. Id.
105. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW 130-46 (1996) (discuss-
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example, a patient might ask a doctor not to provide life-
sustaining equipment, thus ensuring the patient's death. In
another case, a patient might ask a doctor to inject a substance
that will immediately end the patient's life. Many people seem
to have a strong moral intuition that the failure to provide life-
sustaining equipment, and even the withdrawal of such equip-
ment, is acceptable and legitimate-but that the injection is
morally abhorrent. Indeed, American constitutional law reflects
judgments to this effect: people have a constitutional right to
withdraw equipment that is necessary to keep them alive, but
they have no constitutional right to physician-assisted sui-
cide.10 6 What exactly is the morally relevant difference?
It is worth considering the possibility that the act-omission
distinction operates as a heuristic for the more complex and
difficult assessment of the moral issues at stake.' °7 From the
moral point of view, harmful acts are generally worse than
harmful omissions, in terms of both the state of mind of the
wrongdoer and the likely consequences of the wrong. A mur-
derer is typically more malicious than a bystander who refuses
to come to the aid of someone who is drowning; the murderer
wants his victim to die, whereas the bystander need have no
such desire. In addition, a murderer typically guarantees
death, whereas a bystander may do no such thing. (This is an
overgeneralization, of course.) But in terms of either the
wrongdoer's state of mind or the consequences, harmful acts
are not always worse than harmful omissions.
The moral puzzles arise when life, or a clever interlocutor,
comes up with a case in which there is no morally relevant dis-
tinction between acts and omissions, but when moral intuitions
(and the homunculus) strongly suggest that there must be such
a difference. In such cases, we might hypothesize that moral
intuitions reflect an overgeneralization of principles that usu-
ally make sense, but that fail to make sense in the particular
case. 1°8 Those principles condemn actions but permit omissions,
a difference that is often plausible in light of relevant factors
but that, in hard cases, cannot be defended. I believe that the
ing the distinction between acts and omissions in the context of euthanasia).
106. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 724-25 (1997).
107. See BARON, JUDGMENT MISGUIDED, supra note 1, at 95-103 (1998)
(discussing people's tendency to not feel responsible for harm caused by their
failure to act).
108. See Baron, Nonconsequentialist Decisions, supra note 1, at 7-8.
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persistent acceptance of withdrawal of life-saving equipment,
alongside persistent doubts about euthanasia, is a demonstra-
tion of the point. There is no morally relevant difference be-
tween the two; the act-omission distinction makes a difference
apparent or even clear when it is not real.109
Consider in this regard the dispute over two well-known
problems in moral philosophy. The problems do not quite in-
volve the act-omission distinction, but they implicate closely
related concerns. The first, called the trolley problem, asks
people to suppose that a runaway trolley is headed for five peo-
ple, who will be killed if the trolley continues on its current
course.1 ' The question is whether you would throw a switch
that would move the trolley onto another set of tracks, killing
one person rather than five. Most people would throw the
switch. The second, called the footbridge problem, is the same
as that just given, but with one difference: the only way to save
the five is to throw a stranger, now on a footbridge that spans
the tracks, into the path of the trolley, killing that stranger but
preventing the trolley from reaching the others."1 Most people
will not kill the stranger. But what is the difference between
the two cases, if any? A great deal of philosophical work has
been done on this question, much of it trying to suggest that
our firm intuitions can indeed be defended in principle.
11 2
Let me suggest a simpler answer. As a matter of principle,
there is no difference between the two cases. People's different
reactions are based on moral heuristics that condemn the
throwing of the stranger but support the throwing of the
switch. As a matter of principle, it is worse to throw a human
being in the path of a trolley than to throw a switch that, per-
haps indirectly, leads to a death. Hence a heuristic is at work:
Do not take active steps, by your own hands, to kill innocent
people. The relevant heuristic generally points in the right di-
rection. To say the least, it is desirable for people to act on the
basis of a moral heuristic that makes it extremely difficult to
throw innocent people to their deaths. But the underlying heu-
109. There might, however, be practical reasons to believe that the right to
physician-assisted suicide would be more subject to abuse than the right to
withdrawal of life-saving equipment. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A
TIME (1999).
110. See Judith Jarvis Thomson, RIGHTS, RESTITUTION AND RISK 39 (1986).
111. Id. at 82-83.
112. See, e.g., id. at 94-116.
20041 1583
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
ristic misfires in drawing a distinction between the two cleverly
devised cases.
What makes the cases difficult is that they are not distin-
guishable in principle, but moral heuristics, rooted in quite dif-
ferent situations, categorize them as very different. Hence peo-
ple struggle heroically to rescue our intuitions and to establish
that the two cases are genuinely different in principle. But they
are not. In this sense, a moral heuristic leads to errors. It is
good that people are extremely reluctant to throw people in the
path of trains, but in imaginable cases, the extreme reluctance
produces moral blunders. This objection does not bear only on
ingeniously devised hypothetical cases. It suggests that a moral
mistake pervades both common-sense morality and law, includ-
ing constitutional law, by treating harmful omissions as mor-
ally unproblematic or categorically different from harmful ac-
tions.
Is there anything to be said to those who believe that their
moral judgments, distinguishing the trolley and footbridge
problems, are entirely reflective, and reflect no heuristic at all?
Consider a suggestive experiment, designed to see how the
human brain responds to the two problems." 3 The authors do
not attempt to answer the moral questions in principle, but
they find "that there are systematic variations in the engage-
ment of emotions in moral judgment,""4 and that brain areas
associated with emotion are far more active in contemplating
the footbridge problem than in contemplating the trolley prob-
lem. " 5 Of course this experiment is far from decisive; there may
be good moral reasons why certain brain areas are activated by
one problem and not by the other. Perhaps the brain is closely
attuned to morally irrelevant difference. But consider the case
of fear, where an identifiable region of the brain makes help-
116fully immediate but not entirely reliable judgments, in a way
that suggests a possible physical location for some of the opera-
tions of System I. Immediate fear is often corrected by more
reflective System II-like processes occupying other parts of the
brain, in which people conclude, for example, that airplane
travel is not dangerous after all, or that a loud noise is un-
113. See Joshua D. Greene et al., An fMRI Investigation of Emotional En-
gagement in Moral Judgment, 293 Sci. 2105 (2001).
114. Id. at 2107.
115. Id. at 2106.
116. See JOSEPH LEDOUX, THE EMOTIONAL BRAIN 166-74 (1998).
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threatening. So too, perhaps, in the context of morality, politics,
and law.
H. PROBABILITY OF DETECTION
Now turn to another example from the domain of punish-
ment. On the economic account, the state's goal when imposing
penalties for misconduct is to ensure optimal deterrence.'17 To
increase deterrence, the law might increase the severity of pun-
ishment, or instead increase the likelihood of punishment. A
government that lacks substantial enforcement resources
might impose high penalties, thinking that it will produce the
right deterrent "signal" in light of the fact that many people
will escape punishment altogether. A government that has suf-
ficient resources might impose a lower penalty, but enforce the
law against all or almost all violators. These ideas lead to a
simple theory in the context of punitive damages for wrongdo-
ing: the purpose of such damages is to make up for the shortfall
in enforcement. If injured people are 100% likely to receive
compensation, there is no need for punitive damages. If injured
people are 50% likely to receive compensation, those who bring
suit should receive a punitive award that is twice the amount
of the compensatory award. The simple exercise in multiplica-
tion will ensure optimal deterrence.
There remains a large question whether people accept this
account, and if not, why not. (For the moment, let us put to one
side the question whether they should accept it in principle.)
Experiments suggest that people reject optimal deterrence and
do not believe that the probability of detection is relevant to
punishment. The reason is that they use the outrage heuris-
tic."1 8 I participated in two experiments designed to cast light
on this question. '9 In the first, we gave people cases of wrong-
doing, arguably calling for punitive damages, and also provided
explicit information about the probability of detection. 20 The
participants saw the same case, with only one difference: the
probability of detection was substantially varied. People were
asked about the amount of punitive damages that they would
117. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Eco-
nomic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 870-76 (1998).
118. See Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 56, at 63-65.
119. See Cass R. Sunstein et al., Do People Want Optimal Deterrence?, 29 J.
LEGAL STUD. 237 (2000).
120. Id. at 241-42.
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choose to award.' 2 ' Our goal was to see if people would impose
higher punishments when the probability of detection was low.
In the second experiment, we asked people to evaluate judicial
and executive decisions to reduce penalties when the probabil-
ity of detection was high, and to increase penalties when the
probability of detection was low.'22 We wanted people to say
whether they approved or disapproved of varying the penalty
with the probability of detection.
Our findings were simple and straightforward. The first
experiment found that varying the probability of detection had
no effect on punitive awards.'23 Even when their attention was
explicitly directed to the probability of detection, people were
indifferent to it. Their decisions about appropriate punishment
were unaffected by seeing a high or low probability of detection.
The second experiment found that strong majorities of respon-
dents rejected judicial decisions to reduce penalties because of
high probability of detection-and also rejected executive deci-
sions to increase penalties because of low probability of detec-
tion. 124 In other words, people did not approve of an approach to
punishment that would make the level of punishment vary
with the probability of detection. What apparently concerned
them was the extent of the wrongdoing and the right degree of
moral outrage, not optimal deterrence.'25
Of the various problems I have discussed, the rejection of
optimal deterrence is the most difficult for my claim that peo-
ple rely on moral heuristics that generally work well but that
systematically misfire. The rejection is difficult for my claim
because many people have principled reasons for rejecting that
account of punishment (and I personally do not believe in it as
a complete theory of punishment). Most people are intuitive
retributivists of one or another kind, thinking that companies
should be punished in proportion to their wrongdoing. In their
view, it is absurd to impose severe punishment on a company
merely because the probability of detection was low-unless it
could be shown that the company was especially sneaky or
stealthy (and hence that its conduct was especially outrageous).
In the same vein, it might seem odd to be unusually lenient
121. Id.
122. Id. at 244-45.
123. Id. at 243.
124. Id. at 245-46.
125. Id. at 246.
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with a company whose wrongdoing would inevitably be de-
tected and punished.
To say the least, I do not mean to offer a final judgment on
retributivism here. But it seems implausible to suggest that the
aggregate level of misconduct is entirely irrelevant to punish-
ment, or to ignore the fact that a system that refuses to impose
enhanced punishment on hard-to-detect wrongdoing will end
up with a great deal of wrongdoing. Even if retribution is an
important or dominant part of a good system of punishment,
consequences matter as well. Surely steps should be taken,
other things being equal, to deter acknowledged wrongdoing
and to impose extra deterrence in cases where it is needed.
Weak consequentialists do not reject retributivism, but they do
claim that social welfare matters, and that it is appropriate to
impose more punishment on people where the goal of deter-
rence requires it. People's unwillingness to take any account of
the probability of detection suggests that a moral heuristic is at
work--one that leads to real errors.
III. MORAL HEURISTICS, MARRIAGE, AND SEX
Issues at the intersection of morality, marriage, and sex
provide an obvious place for the investigation of moral heuris-
tics. These issues are of course sharply contested, but it is rea-
sonable to hypothesize that at least some of the relevant moral
judgments reflect the operation of moral heuristics. Such heu-
ristics are peculiarly likely to be at work in any area in which
people are likely to think, "That's disgusting!" Recall the earlier
discussion of the question of cloning, where revulsion is a
highly unreliable guide to moral judgment.'26
Any examples here will be contentious (and potentially
embarrassing), but consider the incest taboo. We can easily
imagine incestuous relationships, say between first cousins or
second cousins, that ought not to give rise to social opprobrium,
but that might nonetheless run afoul of social norms or even
the law. The incest taboo is best defended by reference to coer-
cion, psychological harm, and risks to children who might re-
sult from incestuous relationships. But in many imaginable
cases, these concrete harms are not involved. Of course it is
plausible to say that the best way to defend against these
harms is by a flat prohibition on incest, one that has the disad-
126. See supra Part II.D.
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vantage of excessive generality but the advantage of easy ap-
plication. So defended, however, the taboo stands unmasked as
a moral heuristic. In fact people seem to oppose incestuous re-
lationships even if they are assured that no harms will come of
them, and their opposition stays firm even though they are un-
able to justify it.127 Many taboos, in this domain, can be ana-
lyzed in similar terms.
IV. EXOTIC CASES AND MORAL JUDGMENTS:
A METHODOLOGICAL DIGRESSION
Some of these examples will seem more controversial than
others. Taken as a whole, however, they seem to me to raise
serious doubts about the wide range of work that approaches
moral and political dilemmas by attempting to uncover moral
intuitions about exotic cases of the kind rarely if ever encoun-
tered in ordinary life. Should you shoot an innocent person if
that is the only way to save twenty innocent people? 129 What is
the appropriate moral evaluation of a case in which a woman
accidentally puts cleaning fluid in her coffee, and her husband,
wanting her dead, does not provide the antidote, which he hap-
pens to have handy?13 Is there a difference between killing
someone by throwing them into the path of a train and killing
someone by diverting the train's path to send it in someone's
direction?' 3'
I believe that in cases of this kind, the underlying moral
intuitions ordinarily work well, but when they are wrenched
out of familiar contexts, their reliability, for purposes of moral
and legal analysis, is unclear. Consider the following intuition:
Do not kill an innocent person, even if necessary to save others.
(I put to one side the contexts of self-defense and war.) In all
likelihood, a society does much better if most people have this
intuition, if only because judgments about necessity are likely
127. Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social
Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCH. REV. 814, 814-15
(2001).
128. See, e.g., Elizabeth Emens, Monogamy's Law: Compulsory Monogamy
and Polyamorous Existence, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE (forthcoming
2004).
129. Cf Williams, supra note 7, at 97-100 (describing several examples of
moral dilemmas potentially encountered in real life).
130. See THOMSON, supra note 110, at 31.
131. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
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to be unreliable and self-serving. But in a hypothetical case, in
which it really is necessary to kill an innocent person to save
twenty others, our intuitions might well turn out to be unclear
and contested-and if our intuitions about the hypothetical
case turn out to be very firm (do not kill innocent people, ever!),
they might not deserve to be so firm, simply because they have
been wrenched out of the real world context, which is where
they need to be to make sense.
In short, I believe that some legal and philosophical analy-
sis, based on exotic moral dilemmas, is replicating the early
work of Kahneman and Tversky: uncovering situations in
which intuitions, normally quite sensible, turn out to misfire.
The irony is that while Kahneman and Tversky meant to de-
vise cases that would demonstrate the misfiring, some philoso-
phers devise cases with the thought that intuitions are reliable
and should form the building blocks for sound moral judg-
ments. An understanding of how heuristics work suggests rea-
son to doubt the reliability of those intuitions, even when they
are very firm.
Now it is possible that the firmness of the underlying in-
tuitions is actually desirable. Perhaps social life is better, not
worse, because of the large number of people who treat heuris-
tics as moral rules and who believe, for example, that innocent
people should never be killed. If the heuristic is treated as a
freestanding principle, perhaps some mistakes will be made,
but only in exotic and rare cases, and perhaps people who ac-
cept the principle will avoid the temptation to depart from it
when the justification appears sufficient but really is not.
In other words, a firm rule might misfire in some cases,
but it might be better than a more fine-grained approach,
which, in practice, would misfire even more. Those who believe
that you should always tell the truth may do and be much bet-
ter, all things considered, than those who believe that truth
should be told only on the basis of case-specific, all-things-
considered judgments in its favor. Those who insist on an in-
cest taboo might produce a better situation than those who
urge that the taboo should be applied only in cases in which it
is supported by its underlying rationale. Indeed, those who
stick with their sports teams, out of a misplaced sense of moral
obligation, may well be more loyal friends than those who feel
no such sense. My suggestion is not that moral heuristics, in
their most rigid forms, are socially worse than the reasonable
alternatives. It is hard to resolve that question in the abstract.
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I claim only that such heuristics lead to significant errors and a
great deal of confusion.
How do these points bear on the search for reflective equi-
librium? In John Rawls's influential formulation, people's
judgments about justice should be made via an effort to ensure
principled consistency between their beliefs at all levels of gen-
erality. 132 All beliefs are revisable in principle. At the same
time, some of our beliefs, about particular cases and more gen-
erally, seem especially fixed, and it will take a great deal to re-
vise them. Nothing said here should be taken as a basis for
questioning the search for reflective equilibrium. But if moral
heuristics are pervasive, then some of our apparently fixed be-
liefs might be a product of them; we should be aware of that
fact in attempting to reach reflective equilibrium. Judgments
that seem to be most insistent, or least revisable, may result
from overgeneralizing intuitions that work well in many con-
texts but that also misfire.
V. MORAL FRAMING
In cognitive psychology and behavioral economics, empiri-
cal work on heuristics has been accompanied by a literature on
framing effects. 133 For a simple example, consider the question
whether to undergo a risky medical procedure. When people
are told, "Of those who have this procedure, ninety percent are
alive after five years," they are far more likely to agree to the
procedure than when they are told, "Of those who have this
procedure, ten percent are dead after five years."134 Experience
might be expected to solve this problem, but doctors too are
vulnerable to this framing effect. 135 Here the question does not
involve moral and political issues. Might framing effects be
found there as well?
A. THE ASIAN DISEASE PROBLEM
Kahneman and Tversky themselves find moral framing ef-
fects in the context of what has become known as "the Asian
132. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
133. See, e.g., Donald Redelmeier et al., Understanding Patients' Decisions:
Cognitive and Emotional Perspectives, 270 JAMA 72, 73 (1993).
134. See id.
135. Id.
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disease problem."3 ' Here is the first component of the problem:
Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an
unusual Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two
alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed.
Assume that the exact scientific estimates of the consequences
are as follows:
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved.
If Program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability
that 600 people will be saved and a two-thirds probability that
no people will be saved.
Which of the two programs would you favor?
Most people choose Program A.
13 7
Now consider the second component of the problem, in
which the same situation is given but followed by this descrip-
tion of the alternative programs:
If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die.
If Program D is adopted, there is a one-third probability
that nobody will die and a two-thirds probability that 600 peo-
ple will die.
Most people choose Program D. 138 But a moment's reflec-
tion should be sufficient to show that Program A and Program
C are identical, and so too for Program B and Program D.
These are merely different descriptions of the same programs.
The merely semantic shift in framing is sufficient to produce
different outcomes. People's moral judgments about appropri-
ate programs depend on whether the results are described in
terms of "lives saved" or instead "lives lost." What accounts for
the shift? The most sensible answer begins with the fact that
people are risk-averse with respect to gains, but risk-seeking
with respect to losses '39-what counts as a gain or a loss de-
pends on the baseline from which measurements are made.
Purely semantic framing can alter the baseline and, hence, al-
ter moral judgments.
B. FUTURE GENERATIONS
A similar framing effect has been demonstrated in the im-
136. Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 8, at 4-5.
137. Id. at 5.
138. Id.
139. See id.
2004] 1591
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
140portant context of obligations to future generations, a much
disputed question of morality, politics, and law.1 4 ' A regulatory
system that attempts to track people's preferences would try to
measure intergenerational time preferences, that is, to elicit
people's judgments about how to trade off the protection of cur-
rent lives and future lives.' In any case, an important ques-
tion, asked in many debates about the issue, involves the na-
ture of people's moral judgments on that issue. Indeed, an
influential set of studies finds that people believe that it is
morally appropriate to prefer risking few lives in the current
generation to many lives of those in future generations. 43 From
a series of surveys, Maureen Cropper and her coauthors sug-
gest that people prefer saving 100 lives today to saving 7000
lives in 100 years.4 They make this suggestion on the basis of
answers to questions asking whether people would choose a
program that saves "100 lives now" or a program that saves a
substantially larger number "100 years from now.""'
It turns out, however, that the findings by Cropper and her
coauthors are a product of a particular way of framing the
problem, and that other ways of framing the same problem
yield radically different results. 46 For example, most people
consider "equally bad" a single death from pollution next year
and a single death from pollution in 100 years.'47 This finding
implies no preference for members of the current generation. In
addition, people are equally divided between two programs: one
that will save 55 lives now and 105 more lives in 20 years; and
one that will save 100 lives now and 50 lives 25 years from
now. 4 8 This finding also suggests no strong preference for
140. See Shane Frederick, Measuring Intergenerational Time Preference:
Are Future Lives Valued Less?, 26 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 39, 48 (2003).
141. E.g., Richard Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analy-
sis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COL. L. REv. 941 (1999); Com-
ment, Judicial Review of Discount Rates Used in Regulatory Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1333 (1998).
142. See Revesz, supra note 141, at 987-1016.
143. See Maureen Cropper et al., Preferences for Life Saving Programs:
How the Public Discounts Time and Age, 8 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 243
(1994).
144. Id. at 251.
145. Id. at 246.
146. See Frederick, supra note 140.
147. Id. at 43.
148. Id. at 44.
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members of the current generation.1 49
It is even possible to frame the question in such a way as to
find that future lives are valued more, not less, highly than
current lives.15 1 Consider the choice between two programs. The
first would become more effective over time, saving 100 lives
this decade, 200 lives in the following decade, and 300 lives in
the decade after that. The second would become less effective
over time, saving 300 lives this decade, 200 lives in the follow-
ing decade, and 100 lives in the decade after that. Most people
prefer the first program, apparently suggesting that future
lives are valued more highly.' The reason for this seemingly
odd result is that people like things to get better rather than
worse, and they apply this preference, itself a kind of heuristic,
to settings in which it makes little sense. In the same vein,
people tend to prefer increasing wage profiles, even at their
own economic expense. A five-year salary profile of $90,000,
$80,000, $70,000, $60,000, and $50,000 is generally rejected in
favor of one of $50,000, $60,000, $70,000, $80,000, and $90,000,
even though the former is worth more. This preference, pro-
duced by a heuristic, is translated into the moral domain, thus
making it possible to frame questions so that saving lives in the
future is preferable to saving lives immediately.
The simplest conclusion is that people's moral judgments
about obligations to future generations are very much a prod-
uct of framing effects.'53 On this contested issue, there is no
clear or robust judgment that can be elicited through moral
questions. Answers are constructed, rather than elicited, in the
process of response."5
149. See id.
150. Id. at 45.
151. Id.
152. See George Loewenstein & Nachum Sicherman, Do Workers Prefer
Increasing Wage Profiles?, 9 J. LAB. ECON. 67, 71-75 (1991); George Loewen-
stein & Drazen Prelec, Negative Time Preference, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 347
(1991).
153. For a similar result, see Jonathan Baron, Can We Use Human Judg-
ments to Determine the Discount Rate?, 20 RISK ANALYSIS 861, 866 (2000).
154. Compare John W. Payne et al., Measuring Constructed Preferences:
Towards a Building Code, 19 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 243, 266 (1999), for an
argument that in many domains, preferences are constructed rather than elic-
ited by social situations. I am suggesting that the same is true for many moral
issues as well.
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C. LIvEs AND LIFE-YEARS
Consider, as a final example, the question whether in valu-
ing human life, government should take account of the number
of "life-years" saved, or instead use a single number for every
statistical life saved, regardless of the age of the beneficiaries.
Some regulatory programs benefit people who are relatively
young; others benefit people who relatively old. If a program
would prevent fifty deaths of people who are twenty, should it
be treated the same way as a program that would prevent fifty
deaths of people who are seventy? At least since 1976, analysts
have suggested the possibility of focusing regulatory policy on
either life-years or quality-adjusted life-years.'55 The issue re-
ceived a great deal of public attention in connection with recent
debates over the value of statistical life (VSL) and the value of
a statistical life-year (VSLY) within the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) and the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA). 156 OMB has strongly encouraged federal agencies, in-
cluding the EPA, to consider VSLY, 57 and OMB's draft guide-
lines on cost-benefit analysis ask agencies to "consider provid-
ing estimates of both VSL and VSLY."
15
Does OMB's view fit with or violate most people's moral
judgments? The choice between statistical lives or VSL and sta-
tistical life-years or VSLY very much depends on framing. It
should be easy to construct questions that would yield a prefer-
ence for VSL:
Government is considering a policy that would count the
value of elderly people as significantly less than the value of
younger people. According to one proposal, for every dollar that
people under seventy are worth, people over seventy are worth
fifty-three cents. Do you approve of this proposal?
155. Richard Zeckhauser & Donald Shepard, Where Now for Saving Lives?,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1976, at 5.
156. For a discussion, see Cass R. Sunstein, Lives, Life-Years, and Willing-
ness to Pay, COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004); Robert H. Hahn & Scott
Wallsten, Is Granny Worth $2.3 Million or $6.1 Million?, at
http://www.aei.brookings.org/policy/page.php?id=138 (last visited Feb. 26,
2004).
157. See Hahn & Wallsten, supra note 156; Dana Wilkie, White House Con-
tinues to Push for "Age" Discounts in Rulemaking, COPLEY NEWS SERV., May
16, 2003, available at http://www.lexis.comlresearch.
158. See Office of Mgmt. and Budget, Draft 2003 Report to Congress on the
Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations, 68 Fed. Reg. 5492, 5521 (Feb. 3,
2003).
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I have not asked people to answer this question, but it is
safe to predict that most respondents would answer "No." It
should also be easy to construct questions that would suggest
public disapproval of a uniform VSL:
Would you favor (a) a program that would save one hun-
dred children from dying of a fatal cancer at the age of ten or
instead (b) a program that would save one hundred and one
senior citizens from dying of a fatal cancer at the age of eighty?
We can safely predict that most people would favor (a). In
fact I have conducted a small survey myself, asking University
of Chicago law students whether they would favor a policy that
saves twenty people with a median age of forty or one that
saves thirty people with a median age of sixty-five. By a major-
ity of about two-to-one (fifty-three to twenty-five), students fa-
vored the former policy. As in the context of harms to future
generations, highly variable responses should be expected in
accordance with the nature of the question. It is extremely
doubtful that people have stable, well-considered judgments on
the issue.
D. MORAL FRAMING: WHAT FOLLOWS?
In one respect, the effects of framing should be entirely un-
surprising. In the domain of polling and surveys, it is well
known that responses will depend on the way the question is
framed.0 9 What I am emphasizing here is that in many areas,
people's moral assessments are labile; they are constructed
rather than elicited by the question. What follows from this
claim?
The most obvious implications are prescriptive: it is not
difficult to pose questions in a way that will move judgments in
the preferred direction. A key factor here is loss aversion. Peo-
ple do not like losses from the status quo, and in fact they dis-
like losses more than they like corresponding gains.160 More-
over, circumstances can be framed so that changes appear to be
losses rather than gains. Consider two possible ways of encour-
aging people to use energy-conservation techniques:
159. For overviews, see ROGER TOURANGEAU ET AL., THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
SURVEY RESPONSE (2000); Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Do
People Mean What They Say? Implications for Subjective Survey Data (Jan.
2002) (unpublished working paper), http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?
abstract id=260131.
160. See RICHARD H. THALER, QUASI RATIONAL ECONOMICS 5-10 (1991).
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A. If you use energy-conservation techniques, you will save
$X each year.
B. If you do not use energy-conservation techniques, you
will lose $X per year.
It turns out that the second frame, using loss aversion,
produces a larger behavioral shift than the first."' The same
point holds in the legal context. Suppose that a judge or jury is
asked to assign compensatory damages for an injury in a tort
case. Is the question: How much money is needed to make the
plaintiff as well off as he was before the accident occurred? Or is
it instead: How much money would the plaintiff have to have
been offered to accept the injury willingly? According to conven-
tional theory, the answer to the two questions should be the
same; in fact this is the same question, differently framed.
Nevertheless, empirical work shows that the second question
will produce significantly higher figures.'62
In short, it is easy to frame questions in order to shift
moral and legal assessments in the desired directions. But the
normative implications of moral framing are unclear. It might
be that in some domains, people lack robust or well-considered
moral judgments, and what they conclude is inevitably a prod-
uct of framing effects. If so, those who seek to elicit people's
judgment might well use multiple frames, so as to reduce po-
tential distorting effects. 63 Recall that both patients and doc-
tors are more likely to choose a medical procedure if told that
ninety percent of patients are alive after five years than if told
that ten percent of patients are dead after that period."M Ap-
parently people focus on the successes or the failures if they are
informed about either. The identification of one or the other
conjures up an immediate image of life or death, and that im-
age plays a role in ultimate judgments.'
To eliminate the distorting effect of the immediate image-
a kind of System I distortion-it is appropriate to expose people
161. Cf ELLIOT ARONSON, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 124-25 (7th ed. 1995) (de-
scribing the analogous concept of contrast effects).
162. See Edward J. McCaffery et al., Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspec-
tive on Pain and Suffering Awards, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMIcS 259,
276 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).
163. Some lessons emerge from Payne et al., supra note 154, at 249-60.
164. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
165. Hence, the result of this framing exercise seems to me connected to
the findings discussed in Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions,
Worst Cases, and Law, 112 YALE L.J. 61, 74-83 (2002).
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to more than one frame. In the context of the interests of future
generations and the problem of lives versus life-years, some
such approach is clearly desirable. Once it is used, the question
is not a simple one of eliciting people's preferences. It is instead
the beginning of a more complex process of deliberation and
reflection.
CONCLUSION
My principal argument in this essay has been that moral
heuristics and moral framing play a large role in social judg-
ments. Sometimes this is not a problem. In many settings, peo-
ple are subject to multiple framing effects, and it is possible to
think in a way that reduces the distortion introduced by any
single frame. Moral heuristics usually work well, and they can
make it easy to arrive at moral judgments without requiring a
complex and time-consuming inquiry into particular situations.
Even better, moral heuristics can operate in a way that reduces
the effects of venality, self-interest, or other biases that would
undoubtedly confound moral assessments of particular cases.
Along the same lines, moral heuristics have some of the virtues
of rules. They outrun their rationale, and they are overinclu-
sive; but they might work far better than an approach that
tries to investigate, in individual circumstances, whether their
rationale actually applies.
The problem is that moral heuristics, like their factual
cousins, can produce large and systematic errors. If this is
harder to demonstrate in the domain of morality than in the
domain of facts, it is largely because we are able to agree, in
the relevant cases, about what constitutes factual error, and
often less able to agree about what constitutes moral error.
With respect to large-scale disputes about what morality re-
quires, it is too contentious to argue that one side is operating
under a heuristic, whereas another side has it basically right.
But we should avoid undue skepticism here. Frequently moral
evaluations can be made on grounds that seem, or should be,
acceptable to all or almost all, and if so, we have a point of en-
try for the investigation of moral heuristics. I hope that I have
said enough to show that in particular cases, sensible rules of
thumb lead to demonstrable errors not merely in factual judg-
ments, but in the domains of morality, politics, and law as well.
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